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Abstract: Cyberattacks exploiting Universal Serial Bus (USB) interfaces may have a high impact
on individual and corporate systems. The BadUSB is an attack where a USB device’s firmware is
spoofed and, once mounted, allows attackers to execute a set of malicious actions in a target system.
The countermeasures against this type of attack can be grouped into two strategies: phyiscal blocking
of USB ports and software blocking. This paper proposes a distributed architecture that uses software
blocking to enhance system protection against BadUSB attacks. This architecture is composed of
multiple agents and external databases, and it is designed for personal or corporate computers using
Microsoft Windows Operating System. When a USB device is connected, the agent inspects the
device, provides filtered information about its functionality and presents a threat assessment to
the user, based on all previous user choices stored in external databases. By providing valuable
information to the user, and also threat assessments from multiple users, the proposed distributed
architecture improves system protection.
Keywords: USB; threat assessment; BadUSB attack; HID; distributed architecture
1. Introduction
Public and private institutions are constantly dealing with new cyberthreats and cyber-
attacks [1] intended to disrupt infrastructure sectors such as water, power, transportation,
communication and health-care systems [2–4]. At the same time, according to [5], the use
of Universal Serial Bus (USB) drives to transfer data between systems is increasing.
The USB devices offer a large attack surface on computer systems, since they are
affordable, accessible and require low interaction to install and use [6]. The USB-related
attacks exist in multiple forms, such as USB Mass Storage devices that contain malware,
smart drives that include malicious auto-run payloads or programmable Human Interface
Device (HID), where malicious code is embedded in the device’s firmware and asks
to install a hidden USB human interface, such as keyboard, mouse or other interface
devices [7]. An example of the latter attack is known as BadUSB [8,9], which exploits an
vulnerability in USB firmware by reprogramming the USB device to act as a defined HID
and discreetly execute commands or run malicious programs on a target.
The BadUSB attacks can be prevented by adopting specific strategies, such as disabling
USB ports on computers or disabling the Plug and Play (PnP) devices’ installation (i.e.,
disable all peripheral devices). However, these fixes permanently disable the USB capability
and prevent new devices from being mounted. Additional efforts have been made to allow
USB devices to be mounted only after a user verification. Previous work in [10] proposed a
system protection agent that blocks USB devices’ installation and enables users to check
and mount each device after being informed about its category. However, this proposal
had the following limitations: (1) the filtering process is based on a short and less accurate
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vendor-defined Identifier (ID) and (2) the devices are presented to the user without any
prior or distributed threat assessment.
This document proposes a distributed architecture to enhance system protection
against BadUSB attacks. The architecture is composed of agents running in Microsoft
Windows Operating System (OS) and a set external Database (DB). The architecture allows
the intersecting of the installation of the device driver and presents the user with a local
and remote threat assessment based on the identified functionalities of the HID. The threat
assessment is carried out on the basis of information collected anonymously by other users.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents context and the related work.
Section 3 details the proposed distributed architecture. Section 4 describes the implementa-
tion of a functional prototype and provides results. Section 5 draws conclusions.
2. Related Work
The USB is a communication standard [11], commonly used for connecting periph-
erals to computers. Introduced in the 1990s, the USB interface and protocol increased
in popularity because it facilitated communication between peripherals and hosts [12].
However, according to [13], one of the major weaknesses of the USB protocol is its flexi-
bility, and potential threats increase if the device is connected to other devices, networks
or the Internet [14]. An infected computer might uncover confidential information or
personal data, participate in distributed attacks against other computer systems [15], or it
might sabotage computer-controlled industrial processes. As explained in [16,17], a regular
user may plug a USB flash drive found on the ground into a corporate computer without
knowing that it may be an infected device, ready to start an attack. USB drives may turn
into a security threat when they are used to transport and spread malware such, as the
worm Conficker, which impacted a set of computers in Manchester City Council [18,19],
or Stuxnet, a computer worm conveyed in an infected USB thumb drive [20], intended to
hit particular industry sectors [21]. An overview on USB-related attacks can be found in
[22,23].
To classify malicious USB devices, the authors extended the categories defined in [24]
and proposed the following updated list [10]:
1. USB Mass Storage devices containing malware: consists of external USB storage that is
used to inject malicious code to a computer. Examples can be found in [20,25]. If these
devices are shared between multiple computers, the malicious code can be widely
disseminated. Microsoft Windows allowed autorun by default, allowing automatic
file execution, a feature that was later abandoned [26];
2. U3 smart drives: These devices are similar to Mass Storage Devices but have a special
partition that is recognized by Microsoft Windows as a CD-ROM. CD-ROMs can
use the autorun feature to execute malicious code. If the U3 Thumb Drive runs a
malicious autorun payload, then the intention was to harm the system by delivering
malware [24];
3. USB devices in the Middle (USBiM): a USB device that installs activity loggers in the
host computer, such as keyloggers. Some of these devices are available as forensic
tools [27]; however, other devices with malicious purposes fit into this category, such
as printer loggers, or hardware USB sniffers. In [28], a proof of concept is presented,
where a device is capable of achieving the same results as hardware keyloggers,
keyboard emulation and BadUSB hardware implants;
4. Denial of Service USB devices: USB devices intending to disrupt services. An example
of Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) hardware used in this type of attack is the USB
killer [29] that uses the USB power lines to charge capacitors and, when fully charged,
discharge high voltage (200 volts) over the data lines of the host device, permanently
damaging any circuit board with no electrical surge protection. Another example
would be [30] where attackers have compromised over 25,000 devices and used them
to launch a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS);
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5. USB with programmable HID consists of malicious code that is embedded in device’s
firmware and requests a USB human interface. As pointed out in [31], this procedure
provides unacknowledged and malicious functionality that lies outside the apparent
purpose of the device.
The BadUSB attack can be included in the last category. As detailed in [8], this attack
consists of a reprogrammed USB chip capable of emulating other devices. As explained
in [16], unlike USB drives that cannot automatically execute code, HID such as keyboards
do not require user confirmation, nor do they require USB autorun to be enabled in the
target system. Thus, if a device is identified as a keyboard, it is automatically installed and
may send a fast set of keystrokes intended to compromise the machine it is connected to.
The authors in [24] presented a programmable USB device that is capable of performing
the BadUSB attack by emulating a keyboard and typing out commands defined inside a
script stored on the device. Another example is found in [32], where a USB device can
be recognized on a computer as a keyboard and mouse. Current efforts have been made
to tackle BadUSB attacks. Security software firms such as Symantec [33] proposed a set
recommendations, while they do not provide an effective solution to this type of attack. The
authors of [34] proposed protecting data against BadUSB attacks in corporate environments
by using the cloud as a storage method to share information through the internet between
company members. The defenses against BadUSB attacks can be categorized into two
types: physical blocking of USB ports and software blocking.
In physical blocking, the attacker is not able to connect any device to the target system.
Strategies for the physical obstruction of the USB ports may range from the simple filling of
ports with epoxy resin [35] to commercial solutions such as [36], which deposit a lockable
plug into the port. In [37], a simple adapter to physically cover the USB port is presented.
In the software blocking, USB ports are blocked by software/applications. The authors
of [5] propose an application to block the system when a USB drive is inserted. However,
while protecting against BadUSB, blocking the OS operations prevents the regular usage of
the system as well. In [31], GoodUSB is proposed as a system that blocks any USB device
and waits for user authentication before proceeding with installation; however, no further
information regarding threat assessment is provided to aid the user decision.
In the previous work [10], the authors propose a system based on an agent that blocks
PnP device installation on Registry and listens to OS events, waiting for device change
notifications. The solution is available in [38]. For every device that is plugged or removed,
the agent captures the event and then makes a new list of devices that are already plugged.
If a new device is added, the agent obtains its vendor-related IDs to identify and notify
the user about the functionalities before installing. The main limitations of this proposal
are that it uses a short vendor-defined ID, which makes filtering procedures less accurate
and effective, and there is no remote threat assessment to help the user choose whether to
install the device or not.
The current paper proposes a distributed architecture that can be included in the
software blocking category, addresses the limitations of the previous proposals, and thus
enhances the system’s protection against BadUSB attacks. The proposed architecture is
detailed in the next section.
3. Distributed Agent Architecture
The proposed architecture is presented in Figure 1 and is composed of computers,
agents, an External DB, and, in case of a corporate environment, a Corporate DB. The
computers have Microsoft Windows OS installed and the agents are applications installed
in the computers. The External DB holds threat assessment information, which is available
to all agents. In case of a corporate environment, the Corporate DB has a partial threat
assessment information only related to corporate computers.






























Figure 1. A basic scheme of the system distributed architecture.
In case a USB PnP device, such as a keyboard, mouse or other, is plugged into a home
computer (1), OS detects the device, overrides the driver installations and forwards infor-
mation (2) to the agent. The agent (3) identifies the device functionality using information
on the OS driver’s files.
Then, the agent requests a threat assessment from External DB (4), presents it to the
user, and requests action prior to installation (5). In a corporate environment, the procedure
is similar to one for the home computer, but it may use the two Threat Assements (TAs),
one from Corporate DB (4) and the other from the External DB (5), prior to the installation
on (6).
Figure 2 details the internal procedures inside each computer with an agent. First,
when the agent starts, it blocks the PnP device installation on Registry (1), collects all the
information of the devices mounted on the system, and inserts this in a list.
In step (2), the OS generates notifications for every action that occurs on USB ports.
These notifications can be captured by overriding an event handler. If there is an event of
device change (addition or removal), the agent collects a list of mounted devices on the
system.
The mounted devices list is sent to the Agent (3), filtered and inserted in a Devices List.
To allow other PnP devices by default, the agent automatically installs non-USB devices
by retrieving the vendor-defined IDs (Compatible ID and Hardware ID) in a string format,
and then matches this with USB and HID; if a match is found, the agent keeps the devices
blocked.









































Figure 2. Detailed schema for the distributed protection agent.
In (4), the agent compares the new list of devices with the list obtained prior to the
notification in step (2), to check if a new device was added. If a device is not found in
the previous list from step (2), the agent requests functionality and threat assessment
information (5).
The functionality information is obtained through the INF files, which contain informa-
tion such as driver name and location, driver version information and Registry information
[39]. Algorithm 1 presents the procedure used to collect the INF file path and Functionality
Assessment. The agent searches for INF files on the system, which can be found on two
separate folders in Microsoft Windows. The INF path is the path of the file containing the
vendor-defined IDs of the device. The functionality is obtained by the string associated
with the keywords class (class of the device), devicedesc (device description) and svcdesc
(service description).
Algorithm 1: INF File Path/Functionality Assessment Algorithm (step 5)
Result: Returns compatible INF file paths and functionality for a given device
1 Procedure Find INF File
2 foreach (file in INF files) do
3 INFPath=null, deviceFuncionality=null;
4 foreach (line inside file) do
5 if (line contains vendor-defined ID) then INFPath = this file path;
6 if (line contains (class || devicedesc || svcdesc)) then deviceFunctionality = functionality;
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Algorithm 2 presents the threat assessment procedure and user interaction. The
manager performs a query regarding the External DB in order to collect a threat assessment
for the device, and adds it to the list of devices. The result is obtained by searching the
device using the vendor-defined IDs and retrieving the number of users that previously
accepted the device, UA, and the number of users that previously blocked the device, UB.
The threat assessment estimation is a ratio between UA, and the sum of UA with UB. In
step (6), the agent lists all blocked devices and their respective threat assessment. The user
may choose to install the device or declare it as a threat. If the user accepts a device (7),
the agent proceeds with the installation of the driver, which requires the INF file path and
vendor-defined ID of the device. The user actions are sent to the External DB.
Algorithm 2: Threat Assessment Algorithm (step 5) and User Interaction (steps 6 and 7)
1 Query to External DB to obtain UA, UB using vendor-defined IDs;
2 Threat Assessment Estimation = UAUA+UB (×100));
3 if User accepts the device then
4 Install device and send to analysed devices tab;
5 Manager sends an update query to the External DB with the UA + 1 ;
6 else Manager sends an update query to the External DB with the UB + 1 ;
4. Implementation and Results
The proposed distributed agent architecture was implemented as a functional proto-
type with the topology presented in Figure 3. The topology is composed of a corporate
computer and a DB server. The corporate computer features an i7-6700HQ CPU, 16GB
DDR4 2133MHz of RAM and 256GB M.2 SSD of storage capacity. The agent was developed
using C# programming language and deployed in a Microsoft Windows 10 Pro Creators Up-
date, version 10.0.15063. The DB server runs on a computer featuring an Intel Core 2 Duo,
with 4GB DDR2 of RAM and a 125GB Kingston SSD. In the DB server, a WampServer [40]












Figure 3. Test-bed topology.
When running and inserting USB devices, the agent presents an User Interface (UI)
with two tabs: analysed devices and pending devices. Figure 4 presents the analysed
devices tab, with the working devices on the system. Figure 5 shows the pending devices
tab, with a filtered list of pending devices and their threat assessment from Corporate DBs
and External DBs. In this tab, the User Experience (UX) enables users to accept devices or
declare a threat, thus blocking the device.
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Figure 4. Main page with the list of analysed devices.
Figure 5. List of pending devices.
The threat assessments provided by the Corporate DB and the External DB (presented
in Figure 5, respectively, as “Corporate” and “Public”) aid users to take action based on
previous classifications by other users. Thus, we assume that the higher the number of
devices already classified, the higher the quality of the threat assessments presented to the
users.
Multiple USB devices, such as network and Bluetooth adapters, mass storage devices,
keyboards, and mouses, were connected to assess the performance of the proposed archi-
tecture regarding the time needed to find the device functionality. As an example, the set
of devices presented in Table 1 was tested. For each device inserted, the device name from
the OS was obtained, and the agent delay (1) and the installation delay (2) was measured in
seconds. The total delay (3) was determined by the sum of both delays and a ratio between
agent delay (1) and total delay (3) was calculated.
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Table 1. Performance results for some devices tested with ratio included.




Card Reader Writer USB 2.0-CRW 0.56 1.59 2.15 26.04
Kingston DataTraveler
Mass Storage Device DataTraveler G2 0.54 4.45 4.99 10.82
TP-Link Network
Adapter 802.11n NIC 0.58 2.03 2.61 22.22
Bluetooth Adapter ISSCEDRBTA 0.80 1.06 1.86 43.01
Kingston DataTraveler
Mass Storage Device DT 101 G2 0.75 0.67 1.42 52.81
From the set of tested devices, the agent spent between 0.56 and 0.8 s to find the
functionality, corresponding to the time taken to install the device, which ranged between
10.82% and 52.81%. Thus, the additional delay introduced by the agent is considered to not
affect the user experience. Further tests can be conducted to assess how much these delays
vary when using other devices, operating systems or hardware.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
Security attacks using USB devices impose high risks to users and companies. In
particular, the BadUSB attack allows attackers to inject a malicious set of keystrokes on the
OS without the user’s knowledge.
This paper proposes a distributed system protection architecture against BadUSB
attacks designed for personal or corporate computers running Microsoft Windows OS. This
architecture uses software blocking to enhance system protection against BadUSB attacks
and it is composed of multiple agents and external DBs. When a USB device is connected,
the agent inspects the device, and provides filtered information about the functionality and
a threat assessment based on all previous user actions, stored in external DBs. While the
agent is running, all connected USB devices must be approved by the user before use.
A prototype of the proposed architecture was developed and tested. The filtered
information presented in the user interface of the agent intends to aid users in the choice to
either accept or block new devices and, from a set of USB devices tested, the additional
delay introduced by the agent seems not to significantly affect the user experience.
The authors consider that this architecture should be available as an open-source
project, and future work can address this. The UI/UX can be improved, and, taking the
results of a system usability scale tool into account, the option to uninstall devices can be
added, and the overall resilience of the distributed architecture can be enhanced by using a
cloud server DBs.
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